A. INTRODUCTION
The importance of party autonomy in the jurisdictional sphere is undisputed when it comes to international business and commerce. Agreements on jurisdiction increase predictability, reduce the costs of litigation and for some parties provide the luxury of a domestic court. In the early 1960s, legal problems regarding the choice of forum were characterised as being of worldwide signifi cance; 1 and judging by the debate evoked by some of the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in cases involving choice-ofcourt clauses, they still are. 2 Although the European Union (EU) has, in recent decades, signifi cantly broadened the sphere of party autonomy in matters with an international element, the Brussels I Regulation 3 rules on choice-of-court agreements are regarded as overly restrictive and submissive to procedural certainty. 4 The European legislator has acknowledged the problem, and pointed out the "enhancement of the effectiveness of choice of court agreements" 5 as one of the aims of the Brussels I Regulation Recast.
In this article, some particularly important aspects of the newly introduced changes in the Brussels I Regulation regarding choice-of-court agreements are examined in more detail. In Section B, apart from providing a brief history of * Tena Ratković and Dora Zgrabljic´ Rotar are both Assistants at the Private International Law
Chair at the Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb. The authors are thankful to Prof Beaumont for his comments on an earlier draft of this article. The usual disclaimer applies. the Brussels regime, the authors discuss the issue of agreements in favour of third-state courts and the infl uence of the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements on the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation. In Section C, the authors discuss the abandonment of the requirement that at least one of the parties has to be domiciled in an EU Member State for the application of the Brussels I rules to a choice-of-court agreement. In Section D.1, the new Regulation rule on substantive validity of choice-of-court agreements is discussed, concluding that legal certainty is enhanced (at least to some extent) by its inclusion since now every national court in the EU has to apply the law of the chosen court to substantive validity of the agreement. In Section D.2 the authors present the newly introduced rule on severability of choice-ofcourt agreements, paying special attention to the fact that the rule refers to the validity of the agreement without dealing with the existence of the agreement.
In Section E, the issues connected to the newly introduced lis pendens rules of the Regulation are discussed, and some observations on the possible problems related to it are provided.
B. HISTORY, CONTEXT AND SOME OPENING REMARKS
The choice-of-court agreements rules were unifi ed for the fi rst time in Europe in the Brussels Convention concluded as an international treaty on 27 September 1968, which came into force on 1 February 1973. The Convention went through four revisions, 6 after which it was decided to transform the Convention into a Regulation in accordance with the Treaty of Amsterdam and the newly created Community competence to make regulations in this fi eld. The Brussels I Regulation rules on choice-of-forum agreements do not signifi cantly differ from the rules set out in the Convention. 7 The CJEU interpreted the 6 For more information on the four revisions, see U Magnus and P Mankowski (eds), Brussels I Regulation (Sellier, 2nd edn, 2012), 14. Four changes were made to Art 17 of the Convention when it became Art 23 of the Regulation: (i) Art 23(2) "Any communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the agreement shall be equivalent to 'writing'" was added; (ii) Art 17(6) "In matters relating to individual contracts of employment an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall have legal force only if it is entered into after the dispute has arisen or if the employee invokes it to seise courts other than those for the defendant's domicile or those specifi ed in Article 5(1)" was deleted; (iii) Art 17(4) "If an agreement conferring jurisdiction was concluded for the benefi t of only one of the parties, that party shall retain the right to bring proceedings in any other court which has jurisdiction by virtue of this Convention" was deleted; (iv) a provision providing that the jurisdiction will be exclusive, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, was added. The fi rst amendment was introduced as a point of clarifi cation regarding the new technologies; the second because the provision became redundant after the introduction of Art 21 that governs jurisdictional party autonomy explicitly for employment contracts. The most interesting change, especially in the light of the new case law, seems to be the deletion of Art 17(4). The Commission's Proposal does not explicitly explain this amendment. It only refers to the introduction of the provision on non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses by calling it "additional fl exibility" which is Brussels Convention in a number of cases. The interpretation of the Convention equally applies to the Regulation, where its wording does not deviate from the wording of the Convention. 8 In April 2009, the Commission adopted the Green Paper on the Review of the Brussels I Regulation.
9
The Green Paper emphasised the importance of ensuring that choice-of-court agreements "are given the fullest effect".
10
After an extensive public debate on the proposed changes, 11 the Commission gave its Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) ("the Proposal"). The Council and the European Parliament have adopted all of the proposed amendments referring to choiceof-court agreements, most importantly the ones regarding the lis pendens rules, albeit with some technical changes.
Choice-of-Court Agreements Conferring Jurisdiction on Third-State Courts
Although some important changes were included in the provisions on prorogation, the Brussels I Recast has not, however, resolved the problems involving choice-of-court agreements conferring jurisdiction on third-state courts. A general lis pendens rule in respect of proceedings already pending before a court of a third state has been introduced by Article 33. The rule allows the court to stay the proceeding in a case where an action involving the same cause of action and between the same parties is already pending before a thirdstate court and some additional conditions set forth in the same Article are fulfi lled.
12
That lis pendens rule will be, under the same conditions, applicable in cases where the third court fi rst seised is prorogated by the parties' agreement. However, the rule does not resolve all the issues concerning the effect "warranted by the need to respect the autonomous will of the parties" (see the Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters COM(1999) 348 fi nal). This probably led to the conclusion that the parties' possibility to modify the exclusive effects of the agreement includes the possibility to modify it only for the benefi t of one of the parties. However, the French Cour de cassation recently struck down a jurisdiction clause providing for exclusivity only for the benefi t of one of the parties, thus providing for a different view which is opposite to what was formerly set by the rules of the Convention. Judgment no 983 of 26 September 2012 of the Cour de cassation. The Commission received a total of 130 responses to its suggestions for the amendments. of prorogation agreements in favour of third-state courts. 13 This problem has been discussed in one of the fi rst reports on the Brussels Convention, in which Professor Schlosser found that there is nothing in the Convention that would give guidance to the courts on how to deal with the validity of the agreements conferring jurisdiction on a third-state court.
14 According to the CJEU, when a court is faced with a prorogation in favour of a third-state court, it should asses the validity of such a clause according to the applicable national law.
15
Nevertheless, there is still no answer to the question of whether a valid agreement on a third-state court derogates from exclusive jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation. 16 It is surprising that the Recast did not provide any guidance for this kind of situation, especially since the issue has been tackled in the Heidelberg Report, the Nuyts Report and the Green Paper. The last of these deals with the problem within the context of operation of the Regulation in the international legal order where it has been concluded that it might be appropriate to allow a derogative effect of the choice-of-court agreements in favour of third-state courts "for instance, when parties have concluded an exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of the courts of third States".
17
In the Heidelberg Report the reporters expressed their conviction that the issue can and will be resolved by CJEU case law. 18 Notwithstanding the fact that it is possible that the issue can and will be resolved by the CJEU, it might have been more practical if it had been dealt with in a provision of the Recast of the Brussels I Regulation. Admittedly, the task of harmonising the rules to determine cases in which jurisdiction based on the uniform rules of the Regulation should or could be declined in favour of third-state courts is quite delicate.
19
Some even suggested that an appropriate way would have been to introduce a type of forum non conveniens rule. -meaning that the issue of the effect of an agreement on choice of a court of a state which is not an EU Member State or a party to the Hague Convention will still not be resolved. However, the latter leads to the reasonable conclusion that the Commission's intention when not including a provision on the choice of a third-state court was to give an incentive to non-Member States to ratify the Hague Convention when and if the EU ratifi es it. The authors of this article have not examined the problem of the effect of the agreements conferring jurisdiction to third-state courts in more detail, since the Recast has not addressed it, but consider this to be an important topic for further discussion.
Relationship of the Recast with the Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention
An important source of reference for the newly introduced changes in the rules on prorogation was the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.
25
Originally a part of an idea of a broad jurisdictional convention, the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was adopted by the Hague Conference on Private International Law to ensure that choice-of-court agreements are enforced and that decisions of such chosen courts are recognised and enforced in the Contracting States. Proposal, supra n 5, para 3.1.3, Kohler, supra n 13, 201.
22
Kohler, supra n 13, 202. 23 Ibid. The Hague Convention is, as opposed to the Regulation, limited to exclusive choice-ofcourt agreements, and additionally, several matters that are within the scope of application of the Regulation are explicitly excluded from the scope of application of the Convention, eg carriage of passengers and goods. 24 Ibid.
25
The full text of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is published in (2006) At this point, since both the EU and the US have signed the Choice of Court Convention it is safe to assume that the ratifi cation of the Convention by any one of the two would induce a chain reaction in the accession of other states.
30
According to Article 26 of the Choice of Court Convention, the Convention will take precedence over the Brussels I Regulation if there is an actual incompatibility between them, ie if they lead to different results, 31 but excluding the situations when the parties reside exclusively within EU Member States.
32
The two cases of possible incompatibility identifi ed by the Explanatory Report were the lis pendens rules and the insurance rules.
33
Since the "Hague Convention and the Brussels I Regulation have common aims: both strive for promoting international trade and investment by unifying the rules for jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters", 34 it is not surprising that many have advocated alignment of the Regulation's provisions with the solutions set by the Convention. The Heidelberg Report suggested that "regardless of whether the EC accedes to the Convention, its rules could be considered as a possible source for a comparison" 
Transitional Provisions in the Recast
The fi nal version of the Brussels I Regulation Recast was published in the Official Journal on 20 December 2012 (OJ L351/1). According to Article 81, the Recast will apply from 10 January 2015. In the case of choice-of-court agree-
27
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra n 25, Art 31. The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra n 25, Art 26.
33
Hartley/Dougauchi Report, supra n 31, para 267.
34
Supra n 29, 96.
35
Heidelberg Report, supra n 4, para 390. 36 Proposal, supra n 5, para 3.1.3. ments, the rules of the Recast will, under certain circumstances, be applied even to those agreements that were concluded before the Recast enters into force. As established in Sanicentral GmbH v René Collin, a prorogation clause should be assessed according to the rules that are in force at the time of institution of the proceedings.
37
The Recast rules will, consequently, be applicable to a choice-of-court agreement concluded before the Recast entered into force and became applicable, if the judicial proceedings based on that agreement commence after the date when the Recast starts applying, ie after 10 January 2015.
38
The amended rules are, thus, at this point especially important when it comes to choice-of-court agreements, since it is possible that the Recast rules will apply to agreements made at this or at an earlier point in time.
C. DOMICILE OF THE PARTIES TO A CHOICE-OF-COURT AGREEMENT
According to the wording of the pre-recast Brussels I Regulation, at least one of the parties has to be domiciled in a Member State for the application of the rules in Article 23 on a choice-of-court agreement, apart from those in Article 23(3) discussed below. If none of the parties is domiciled in a Member State, the designated court will apply its own national rules to determine whether it has jurisdiction based on that choice-of-court agreement. It is irrelevant whether it is the plaintiff or the defendant who is domiciled in the Member State.
39
This follows from the nature of the situation in which it would be impossible to know at the time of the conclusion of the contract which procedural roles the parties will have in the future. That differs from the general rule on the scope of application ratione personae set out in Article 4 of the Regulation, under which the rules of the Regulation will only be applicable when the defendant is domiciled in a Member State. 40 For defendants domiciled in third states, the national rules of the court will be applied. Notwithstanding the fact that the general personal scope of application rule differs slightly from the rule for the scope of application of the choice-of-court rule, they are both consist- 37 The court reasoned that "a choice has no legal effect for so long as no judicial proceedings have been commenced and only becomes of consequence at the date when judicial proceedings are set in motion": Case 25/79 Sanicentral GmbH v René Collin [1979] ECR 03423, para 6. ent with the main idea that it is necessary to apply national rules over parties domiciled in third states under certain circumstances.
Under the pre-recast wording of the Regulation Article 23(3), a choice of an EU Member State court made by non-residents of the EU will derogate from the jurisdiction of all other Member States' courts. Such a choice-of-court agreement will have a derogative effect if it is formally valid under the rules of the Regulation. 41 Thus, although the prorogative effect will be determined in accordance with the national rules of the designated court, the derogative effect is determined in accordance with the rules of the Regulation.
The rejection of the expansion of the scope of application of the entire Regulation over non-EU defendants did not infl uence the abandonment of the domicile requirement when it comes to choice-of-court agreements. Thus, under the Recast two non-EU residents can choose a Member State court and if that choice is valid under the rules set by the Regulation, the chosen court will have jurisdiction over their dispute. This change was never controversial as its main purpose is to respect the parties' will. This constitutes a small step forward in the application of the Regulation rules over non-EU defendants. However, even though the rules of the Regulation will apply when the choiceof-court agreement is valid under its rules, that might not be the case if the choice-of-court agreement does not comply with the rules of the recast, eg with its rules on formal validity. If an agreement is not valid under the Brussels I Regulation and is valid under the national law, national courts will still have jurisdiction based on their national rules.
42

D. VALIDITY AND SEVERABILITY OF CHOICE-OF-COURT AGREEMENTS
Substantive Validity of the Choice-of-Court Agreements
Formal validity of choice-of-court agreements is clearly governed exclusively by the Brussels I Regulation and before that the Convention. It was confi rmed in 1981 in Elefanten Schuh that the Convention "intended to lay down itself the formal requirements which agreements conferring jurisdiction must meet", 43 which rendered any additional formal requirements stemming from national law inapplicable. Which rules govern the substantive validity of a choice-ofcourt agreement, on the other hand, was an issue that was never so clear. The problem in determining which law will govern the substantive validity has two 41 Schlosser, supra n 14, para 177. sides: (i) the extent of application of national law; and (ii) which national law should be applied.
44
From the very early stage of application of the Brussels Convention, the CJEU's case law has favoured the autonomous application of Article 17 (later Article 23 of Brussels I) without reference to national law as to formation of consent, and consequently inferred that there was no scope for its application to the substantive validity of the choice-of-court clauses. 45 In Estasis Salotti v Rüwa, the CJEU states that "[t]he purpose of the formal requirements imposed by Article 17 is to ensure that the consensus between the parties is in fact established". 46 The prescription of formal requirements in the Regulation is therefore aimed both at establishing and proving the parties' consent. Later case law only confi rmed that stance, 47 but the national courts still resort to application of national rules when the formation of consent is in question. 48 According to the Heidelberg Report,
his result is probably owed to the circumstance that the Regulation, on one hand, intends to harmonise the requirements for a valid choice of form agreement but, on the other hand, tries to respect the Member State law on the conclusion of contracts." Heidelberg Report, supra n 4, para 376. See infra nn 61-65 and accompanying text. In Study JLS/C4/2005/03 "Compilation of All National Reports, Questionnaire No 3: Legal Problem Analysis", http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_bxl1_compilation_quest_3_en.pdf (accessed 12 March 2012), 388-95 it is seen that some states only referred to the CJEU's case law (Belgium, Czech Republic, the United Kingdom to some extent, and Portugal in which the question never arose so the CJEU's case law and Art 23 were suffi cient). 49 Heidelberg Report, supra n 4, para 376. ments of Article 23. The CJEU's interpretation of consent is driven by facilitation of the judicial task to estimate the prorogation clause's validity as well as by respect for the autonomy of the parties, which still cannot solve the mentioned issues since they are not regulated on the EU level -either in the Brussels I Regulation or in any other piece of legislation. The notion of consent, as interpreted by the CJEU, has an autonomous meaning which includes only the prima facie evidence of consensus that will suffi ce if none of the parties alleges any of the above-mentioned concerns. Therefore, a number of authors have suggested that one should resort to national law to solve such issues if they are invoked during the proceedings. in which, as Merrett states, it was concluded that "it was bad faith to rely on the formality requirements to deny the agreement".
52
According to Merrett, the principle should be developed autonomously in the EU, although this is only implied, through the CJEU's case law which would resemble the effect of the English notion of mistake in contracts. 53 The principle would then govern the validity of prorogation clauses through invoking bad faith when a jurisdiction agreement concluded in troubled circumstances is relied upon which would lead to its invalidity.
54
This would avoid the application of national law and would be dealt with by a commonly accepted principle of good faith in the EU. Keeping everything on the EU level seems like a good path to take, but it is unlikely that agreement on such a principle could be reached by all the Member States. 55 Even Merrett admits that bona fi des is differently construed and applied in common law and continental law jurisdictions.
56
A solution based on general principles can also be found in German writings that advocate application of the abuse-of-rights doctrine as employed in the operation of general terms of trade. Merret, supra n 45, 558. 54 Ibid, 558-60. correctly point out that the CJEU has not developed an autonomous meaning of substantive validity in 30 years of case law and that there is no political will in the Council to harmonise European contract law.
59
The Heidelberg Report mentions three solutions regarding the issue of substantive validity: inclusion of a confl ict-of-laws rule mirroring the one from the Hague Choice of Court Convention; harmonisation of the question of validity of choice-of-court agreements in the future Common Frame of Reference of EU law; or a combination of both.
60
The EU legislator opted for the fi rst version, which, unfortunately, does not straightforwardly solve the issue of formation of consent between the parties and the scope of application of national law in that area.
61
The introduction of the confl ict-of-laws rule confi rms the standpoint of those authors who claimed that the requirements of Article 23 of Brussels I are not self-suffi cient with respect to substantive validity. With the new choiceof-law rule, the logical interpretation of the new provision on choice-of-court agreements (Article 25 of the recast) divides validity of choice-of-court agreements into three parts: formal validity in its usual sense; validity as to prima facie consent (referred to as formal consent 62 ); and substantive validity which excludes formal consent, but includes, for example, fl aws in the creation of consent and capacity to enter into the contract. Formal validity and the formal part of the consent are dealt with on the EU level, ie by formal requirements solely under the new Article 25. Other issues involving consensus, as well as the residue of substantive validity, would be governed by application of national law to which the confl ict-of-laws rule refers. Therefore, the pro-unifi cation and pro-choice-of-court standpoint of the EU is preserved since formal requirements will most probably refl ect the real consensus of the parties.
Besides determining the extent of application of national law under the pre-recast text of the Brussels I Regulation, the problem lies in determining which national law is applicable to the substantive validity of choice-of-court 
67
This could lead to a choice-of-court agreement being valid in one Member State but not in another due to the applicability of either of the two approaches according to the forum's private international law.
68
A choice-of-court agreement's validity being dependent on the seised forum's confl ict of laws is therefore avoided by the inclusion of the uniform confl ict-of-laws rule.
The EU legislator decided to apply the law of forum prorogatum to the issue of substantive validity, including its private international law rules. Cyprus, Greece, Ireland as well as Finland which applies either lex fori or lex causae. See Compilation of All National Reports, supra n 48. 65 Austria, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and Spain. Ibid.
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Heidelberg Report, supra n 4, para 377.
67
Germany to some extent, Italy, Slovenia. Compilation of All National Reports, supra n 48. Dickinson, supra n 45, 301 states that declaring the formulation "null and void" is very "unsatisfactory for common law lawyers to whom vitiating factors such as fraud or duress may render a contract voidable not void". It seems that a better formulation would be simply "invalid". 71 There is no difference in the effects of the Commission's Proposal ("unless the agreement is null and void as to its substance under the law of that Member State") and the Parliament's amendment ("unless the agreement is null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that Member State").
72
Art 5(1) states that: "The court or courts of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that State." 73 The Recast Regulation refers specifi cally to substantive validity ("null and void as to its substantive validity under the law of that Member State").
works toward the aim of facilitating the "possible conclusion of this Convention by the European Union". 74 Another possible solution was to opt for the lex causae as the law applicable to substantive validity. Some argue that in that case the consistency of the whole transaction would be upheld since it would not "divorce the validity of the choice of court agreement from the overall validity of the contract" 75 as the chosen approach does. Application of two different laws to two different contracts that are closely connected could hinder the operation of the economic transaction they serve by making one contract valid and the other invalid. Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind that the two contracts are severable which makes the existence of one contract independent from the other. Therefore, it is clear that inclusion of renvoi within the new Article 25 is intended and the question whether the jurisdiction agreement is null and void is therefore to be ascertained under the substantive law to which the confl ict-of-laws rules of the Member State of the chosen court refer. Therefore, before some chosen courts the internal law will be applied to the validity of the prorogation agreements, while others will apply the lex causae to the same issue.
Some authors are not keen to accept renvoi in the determination of the validity of jurisdiction agreements, 79 arguing that it is in accordance with the principles of contractual relations, especially when governed by party autonomy, to exclude renvoi from the operation of private international law rules, Regulations. However, in some cases it would not be reasonable to apply the chosen court's substantive law on, for example, capacity to enter a prorogation agreement since often the main reason for the choice is neutrality of the forum, meaning that the parties have no or only tenuous connections with the forum state. Similarly, when the only reason for the choice is the experience and promptness of the court and the connections between the parties and the chosen forum are weak, it is also advisable to apply the private international law of the chosen forum to determine the capacity to enter into a prorogation agreement. For those limited cases application of renvoi is justifi able since it will lead to the application of a closely connected law to the issue. The same can be said for the situation where the parties have made a choice of law that differs from the law usually applied before the chosen court -renvoi to the chosen law should be applied in order to respect party autonomy. 83 Therefore, it was submitted by Beaumont and McEleavy that renvoi is to be applied in case of choice of law, ie when there is a subjective connecting factor, and should not extend to the objectively applicable law of another country.
84
In addition, in cases of duress or fraud, it is not clear how renvoi can help in solving the issue of the substantive validity of the prorogation clause. It can surely complicate the judicial task, 85 especially in common law countries where the parties will probably have to submit evidence on the foreign law's standpoint on renvoi and not only on its private international law rules as in civil law countries.
Notwithstanding that there is no doubt that legal certainty is enhanced to some extent by the new choice-of-law rule requiring every national court in the EU to apply the same applicable law to substantive validity of the same agreement, legal certainty and uniformity will still not be absolutely ensured since the private international law rule for substantive validity varies from Member State to Member State. 86 The capacity of a natural person to enter into a contract and choice-of-court agreements are left out of the scope of the Rome I Regulation, 87 which means that each Member State is allowed to apply its own rules for that issue. Ibid.
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Uisnier, supra n 59, 64-65 discusses the same diffi culty with respect to the Hague Convention. 86 Queirolo, supra n 39, 191.
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Art 1(2)(a) and (e). 88 Therefore, it was suggested that such a rule is included into the Rome I Regulation. See Camilleri, supra n 62, 317-18. However, even the Report on the Rome Convention that preceded the Rome I Regulation stated that "each court is obliged to determine the validity of the agreement on the choice of court in relation to its own law, not in relation to the law chosen. Given the nature of these provisions and their fundamental diversity, no rule of confl ict can lead to a Inclusion of renvoi allowed Member States to retain their policy in determining the capacity of persons to enter into the agreement as well as other concerns of substantive validity. It remains to be seen how renvoi will be applied and whether it will slow the judicial process and thereby endanger the effectiveness of choice-of-court agreements.
Severability of Choice-of-Court Agreements
The Brussels I Regulation Recast includes a new provision referring to the severability of choice-of-court agreements. 89 Neither the Brussels Convention nor the Brussels I Regulation contains a similar provision. Nonetheless, severability of choice-of-court agreements was, even before the explicit wording in the Recast, established by the CJEU case law. The wording might raise some questions on the intended scope of severability of the prorogation agreements: by mentioning only the validity of the agreement, an issue on whether the problems in determining the existence of the main contract infl uences the existence of the choice-of-court agreement might be raised in the application of the provision.
This question is inevitably tied to the issue tackled in the previous subsection; however, it does differ from the above discussion in some respects. To answer the question of whether the existence of the choice-of-court agreement falls within the defi nition of validity according to the Regulation, and consequently provides that the existence of the main contract and the existence of the choice-of-court agreement should be examined separately, two points have to be addressed. Firstly, one has to defi ne formal validity and substantive validity within the meaning of the Brussels I Regulation. As already discussed above in Section D.1, the validity of choice-of-court agreements can be understood uniform solution." M Giuliano and P Lagarde, "Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations" [1980] OJ C282/1, 11.
89
Art 25(5) states that an agreement conferring jurisdiction which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. as a three part test: formal validity, formal consent and substantive validity. The fi rst two are dealt with by the Brussels I Regulation autonomously; while substantive validity is, according to the confl ict-of-laws rule, provided by the Regulation, governed by the law of the chosen forum.
The second question that follows from the above conclusion is whether existence of the contract falls within the scope of formal validity, substantive validity, or neither of these. If existence is a part of formal or substantive validity, the wording of the severability clause provides a basis to decide the existence of the main contract and the prorogation clause separately, since it mentions explicitly only the validity of the contract. If the existence, on the other hand, does not fall within the defi nition of either formal or substantive validity, an issue of whether there is a ground to decide on the existence of the two otherwise separate contracts together might occur in practice.
As has already been pointed out by other authors "the existence of the parties' choice is far more complicated than it appears".
93
It has been argued that existence of the choice-of-forum clause should not be equated with the validity of the choice or its formal validity.
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In the comments and discussion on the same issue regarding the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which, as already mentioned, has the same wording on severability as the Regulation, scholars have taken three different approaches. The fi rst approach considers the existence of choice-of-court agreements as an issue that does not fall within the scope of either formal or substantive validity.
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A different view is, however, expressed by the explanatory report, which seems to equate the existence of the contract with the consent of the parties, ie the substantive validity which is governed by the law of the chosen court.
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Under the third approach, the existence of the choice-of-court agreement is covered by the formal validity of the contract, precisely because the idea of the drafters of the Convention was to have strict rules provided by the Convention that would not allow fl exibility in the courts' decisions on the existence of choice-of-court agreements that fall within the scope of the Convention.
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Without further exploring the issue in general or in the context of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, the latter view on the question of existence and formal validity is the most appropriate one when applying the Brussels I Regulation. Finally, a similar understanding was provided by the CJEU in Gasser v MISAT, although not in the context of severability of the choice-of-court agreement, and not as explicitly as might be wished. In Gasser 93 Tang, supra n 50, 41. the Court found that the existence of the choice-of-court agreement should be determined in accordance with the rules set by the Regulation.
98
Thus the newly introduced provision on the severability of choice-of-court agreements under the Brussels I Regulation Recast should be understood to mean that the courts should examine the existence, formal validity and substantive validity of the choice-of-court agreements independently from the existence, formal validity and substantive validity of the main contract.
E. THE CHOSEN COURT AND THE LIS PENDENS RULE
The lis pendens rule contained in Article 27 of the pre-recast Brussels I Regulation 99 is a successful mechanism for reducing parallel litigation in the EU. 100 It basically functions as a fi rst-come, fi rst-served rule, meaning that the court second seised must stay proceedings until the court fi rst seised decides on its jurisdiction.
In a well-known and widely criticised CJEU judgment, Gasser v MISAT, 101 the Court applied the lis pendens rule very strictly. The case concerned a choice-of-court agreement in favour of Austrian courts, but MISAT started the proceedings before an Italian court in disregard of the parties' agreement. What was so surprising about Gasser is that the CJEU gave no preference to the chosen court, but applied Article 27 literally, problem was also addressed by the national court that sent the preliminary questions but only resulted in the CJEU's reminder on the importance of mutual trust between Member States. 106 The result of the decision, according to some authors, was a future preference for arbitration over litigation in the European Judicial Area. 107 The Gasser judgment raised many concerns since it is thought to support bad faith litigation and delaying tactics. 108 According to some authors, the existing regime weakens the exclusivity of a prorogation agreement as a jurisdictional basis since no preference is given to it in the case of parallel adjudication. 109 The changes to the Brussels I Regulation are driven by all these objections. 110 The Commission's Proposal introduced two major changes: derogative effect of the exclusive choice-of-court agreementsl 111 and a time frame of six months in which the court fi rst seised should decide on its jurisdiction.
112
The Commission's Proposal had the same lis pendens rule -a derogative one -for exclusive jurisdiction under Article 22 of the Brussels I Regulation and for exclusive choice-of-court agreements. The adopted regime differs both from the exclusive jurisdiction lis pendens rule, which still derogates jurisdiction of all courts apart from those in Article 22 (new Article 24), and from the non-exclusive jurisdictional bases for which the traditional fi rst-come, fi rst-served rule still applies. According to the fi nal version contained in the Recast, "any court of another Member State shall stay the proceedings until such time as the court seised on the basis of the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under the agreement". 113 This solution softens the derogative effect of the jurisdiction agreement and circumvents the need to seek a declaration of invalidity before seising a non-chosen court.
It should be remarked that the change only refers to exclusive choice-ofcourt agreements; non-exclusive ones will still be subject to the old regime. The diffi cult task of evaluating the exclusivity of prorogation agreements is alleviated by the Brussels I Regulation itself which prescribes a presumption in favour of exclusivity. 114 The courts will still sometimes have to engage in the task of deciding whether the intended prorogation was exclusive or not, which could prolong the proceedings. However, making the lis pendens rule differ depending on the nature of the prorogation agreements is reasonable since when the parties agree on a non-exclusive prorogation it is not necessary to give absolute priority to the chosen court since the agreement does not oust other courts' jurisdiction.
The new Article infers that if the opposing party only objects to the nonchosen court's jurisdiction, without seising the chosen court, the fi rst may decide on its jurisdiction without staying the procedure. Unfortunately, the other party is compelled to seise the chosen court in order to trigger the application of the new rule. If the opposing party fails to seise the chosen court, the non-chosen court's decision on its jurisdiction is res judicata and is susceptible to recognition and enforcement. 115 Therefore, there is a risk that the non-chosen court's incorrect positive decision on its own jurisdiction will be binding for the parties and other courts, but the number of such situations will hopefully be small.
Once the chosen court is seised, the non-chosen one has to stay the proceedings and wait for the chosen court's decision. Under Article 31(3), if the chosen court establishes its jurisdiction, every other court that was seised of the same dispute must decline its jurisdiction. In this way, there is no danger of parallel adjudication, the abolition of which is one of the Regulation's main goals. 116 Therefore, the parties always have the right to seise the chosen court so that it can decide on its own jurisdiction, but they can waive that right by not seising it and leave the decision to the non-chosen court.
However, the objection of the respondent is crucial since its repercussion is not merely making the non-chosen court aware that there is a prorogation agreement between the parties but also avoiding submission to the non-chosen court. Since the submission to the non-chosen court's jurisdiction under Article 24 (new Article 26) overrides the prorogation agreement, 117 the party has to object to the non-chosen court's jurisdiction when entering an appearance before or at the same time as, but not later than, submitting the fi rst defence. 118 sham agreements or invalid ones. 119 Since the Recast Brussels I Regulation did not adopt the six-month rule, 120 the problem known as the Italian torpedo could easily occur again. It is true that the evaluation of the existence of the choice-of-court agreement is "a process which may necessitate delicate and costly investigations", 121 especially if estimating the formal validity which accords to international usages or practice which is established between the parties. 122 Some authors even claim that the deadline rule is not an appropriate solution, since not all cases demand the same time frame 123 and national procedures vary. 124 Nevertheless, including the six-month rule for situations of parallel procedures when a choice-of-court agreement exists seems reasonable, 125 since only its existence would have to be decided in that deadline and Member States have already successfully complied with deadlines in some other procedural aspects imposed by EU law. 126 Some might say that the timeframe rule is anyway ineffective since there is no sanction for its breach in the Brussels I Regulation. However, the CJEU has already said that even Member State courts can breach EU law, 127 so the sanction could be provided in infringement proceedings 128 or in state liability for the breach. 129 tion, primarily due to the Commission's reluctance to start such proceedings, it could be an effi cient one since the pressure on Member States and their courts is higher if the infringement procedure or state liability is possible.
What could create a problem with the time frame rule is that the evaluation of the validity should not remain only a prima facie one, since the decision on jurisdiction of one Member State court could not contradict the decision of the other, unless some new evidence is produced before the latter. If the chosen court decides that the prorogation agreement is invalid and declines jurisdiction, the court that will have jurisdiction on an objective jurisdictional basis cannot conclude differently. Another problem could occur in some procedural systems of Member States which demand jurisdictional and substantive questions to be evaluated simultaneously, 130 which could hardly be achieved in only six months. However, it would not be the fi rst time that Member States need to implement additional procedures or alter the existing ones to comply with EU law. The change would only apply to a decision on jurisdiction in choice-of-court agreements when two courts are seised, whereas the existing system could remain in all the other cases.
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The problem could be solved by giving primacy in the national system to this type of case and using existing procedures that are more expeditious. Prescribing a deadline for a decision on jurisdiction allows for respect of party autonomy, the importance of which is emphasised in the Preamble to the Recast Regulation. 132 Therefore, the solution as given by the Recast with the addition of the time frame rule seems the best one that could be given.
In addition, there is a limit in the new lis pendens rule in Article 31(4) regarding consumer, employment and insurance contracts. Namely, the special lis pendens rule for the prorogation agreements will not be applied if (a) the weaker party (the policyholder, the insured, a benefi ciary of the insurance contract, the injured party, the consumer or the employee) is the claimant in the proceedings, and if (b) the agreement is invalid, ie if the conditions set out in Articles 15, 19 and 23 133 of the Recast are not fulfi lled.
134
The purpose is to protect the weaker party that seises the non-chosen court from "torpedo actions" before the invalidly chosen court. If the weaker party is the claimant and he/she relies on the objective jurisdiction basis, the invalidly chosen court should have no primacy in determining its jurisdiction, and the regular fi rst-come, fi rst-served 130 Heidelberg Report, supra n 4, para 178. 131 Cf Fentiman, supra n 107. 132 Recitals 15 and 19 of the Preamble to the Brussels I Regulation Recast, supra n 12. 133 The conditions set out in those provisions remained the same and protect the weaker party to the contract, ie allowing an agreement only after the dispute has arisen, where the agreement gives more choice to the weaker party and so on. 134 The provision as it stands was inserted by the Parliament and the Council. The Commission's Proposal completely excluded choice-of-court agreements in employment, consumer and insurance contracts from the application of the special lis pendens rule.
rule from Article 29 will hence be applied. Therefore, the fi rst-seised court will be the one to check the conditions from Articles 15, 19 and 23, and if these are not fulfi lled it can proceed in accordance with Article 29. If the fi rst-seised court is the invalidly chosen one, it should dismiss the claim. If it is the nonchosen one, it should proceed with the litigation before it after concluding that the choice does not fulfi l the special conditions set out in Articles 15, 19 and 23. In both cases, the stronger party cannot avail itself of the special lis pendens rule which could cause signifi cant delays due to the primacy of the invalidly chosen court. However, if the choice is valid under the special conditions of Articles 15, 19 and 23, there is still a chance that it is invalid under the general requirements of Article 25, which will be checked by the chosen court since the special lis pendens rule will be applied and that court will proceed with the litigation. The effect of the rule in other cases, when the weaker party seises the invalidly chosen court, is a little unclear and it is not certain whether the rule aims to apply in those situations as well.
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It would be more reasonable if it was clearly stated that the regular lis pendens rule is applicable if the weaker party is the claimant before the non-chosen court since the purpose is the protection of the weaker party from those prorogation agreements that do not comply with special conditions aiming at protection of that party.
To conclude, in the hierarchy under the Recast, the chosen court will prevail over a non-chosen court and will be able to decide on its own jurisdiction unless the defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the non-chosen court. The choice of court cannot in any case prevail over exclusive jurisdictional bases. 136 Therefore, the exclusivity of the choice-of-court agreements is still "just a description of its capacity to wholly displace other jurisdictional grounds, on a party autonomy basis".
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The effect is similar to exclusive jurisdiction when compared to the general and special jurisdictional bases, but it is still overridden by submission and excluded in cases of disputes for which the exclusive jurisdiction is prescribed. 135 If the weaker party seises the invalidly chosen court fi rst, the court second seised would have to stay the proceedings according both to Art 29 (being the second seised) and Art 31(2) (being the non-chosen one). Therefore, Art 31(4) clearly has no purpose here. If the weaker party seises the invalidly chosen court second, it would have to stay the proceedings under Art 29 and could proceed under the rules on lis pendens for choice-of-court agreements. In these cases, Art 31(4) makes a difference. It means that in such a case, the chosen court would have to assess the validity (compliance with special conditions for the weaker parties) if there is an objection of the other party and if it concludes that the choice is invalid, the regular lis pendens rule will be applied. However, there will be no need to apply that rule since the court will most probably dismiss the claim since it will have no jurisdiction to proceed. 136 Art 23(4) of the Brussels I Regulation, supra n 3. 137 Delaygua, supra n 109, 292.
F. CONCLUSION
Several important changes within the rules dealing with choice-of-court agreements have been introduced by the Recast, not only changes in the Article on choice-of-court agreements per se, but also the widely discussed rules on lis pendens.
The most important novelty is found in Article 31(2), providing that any other court shall stay the proceedings until the court seised on the basis of the agreement declares that it has no jurisdiction under the prorogation agreement. At fi rst glance, the provision successfully resolves the problem known as the "Italian torpedo", connected to the CJEU's decision in Gasser v MISAT. However, a couple of obstacles can occur in the application of the provision that may not lead to the best possible solutions. Firstly, in order to trigger its application the opposing party has actually to seise the chosen court. Thus, if the opposing party only objects to the non-chosen court's jurisdiction, the fi rst-seised court can decide on its jurisdiction without staying the procedure. Secondly, since the proposed introduction of the time frame of six months for a decision of the seised court on its jurisdiction was not accepted, the problem of the Italian torpedo might again occur in cases of invalid or sham agreements. Notwithstanding these two possible problems, the newly introduced rules on lis pendens will preserve the parties' agreement much better than the application of the old general rule on lis pendens did.
Three changes have been introduced into the text of the old Article 23 to create the new Article 25. The fi rst one is the abandonment of the requirement that at least one of the parties must be domiciled in the EU for the provisions to apply fully. Since under the current wording of the Regulation, a choice of court made by non-residents of the EU, although without a prorogative effect, will derogate jurisdiction of all other Member States' courts, this is not a revolutionary change. It does, however, render the national rules in those situations inapplicable, and is thus a step towards the application of the Regulation rules over non-EU defendants. On the other hand, the Recast did not resolve an important issue, namely situations where the parties have agreed on the jurisdiction of the third-state court and the effect of such agreements on jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation. The probable aim was to create an incentive for third states to ratify the Hague Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements when the EU ratifi es it. Further, a confl ict-of-laws rule has been introduced according to which the law of the chosen court is applicable to the substantive validity of the agreement. However, even though the inclusion of this provision did resolve an old problem encountered by the national courts, the inclusion of renvoi resulted in a situation where each Member State is still allowed to apply its own rules for that issue. Finally, the inclusion of an express clause on severability of choice-of-court agreements confi rmed what has already been established by the CJEU's case law.
